We study the effect of countries' historical legacy with corruption on recent climate change policies and on global cooperation. Current policy outcomes build on policy choices made in previous years, and these choices were likely affected by the degree of corruption at the time. Our empirical findings using data for up to 131 countries suggest that accumulated historical experience with corruption is important for today's policy outcomes, and appears to be more important than the current level of corruption.
Introduction
Suppose a country is currently relatively free of corruption. Does it matter for environmental policy outcomes whether this country has had low corruption for an extended time period (the good old days), or has suffered a long history of widespread corruption (the bad old days) and improved only very recently? That is, does a country's path to today's level of corruption matter for climate change policies? The climate change policies in effect today are the result of a myriad of decisions taken during the last few decades, and the level of corruption at the time these decisions were taken likely played an important role. In this paper, we make a first attempt to answer the above question, thereby also providing a fresh perspective in the vast literature on the effects of corruption more generally.
Our approach is to create a measure of the "Corruption-control capital stock". The Corruption-control capital stock is here defined as a country's accumulated stock of historical experience with freedom from (i.e., control of) corruption, that is, the degree to which a country has accumulated experience with the absence (good old days) as opposed to the presence (bad old days) of corrupt practices in political, bureaucratic and economic activities, etc. The Corruption-control capital stock concept is similar to the "democratic capital stock" suggested by Persson and Tabellini (2009) , defined as a country's accumulated stock of civic and social assets built by historical experience with democracy.
Our analysis sheds new light on the debate in the literature on whether corruption or democracy is the main determinant of environmental policy outcomes. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) show that while current corruption is an important determinant of an index of agricultural environmental policy stringency (based on surveys completed by the relevant governments, business and non-governmental organization representatives), current democracy has a minor and statistically insignificant effect once corruption is included in the estimation model. We compare the effect of the Corruption-control capital stock with the impact of the democratic control stock, which Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) found to be an important determinant of climate change policies. We find that both corruption and democracy are statistically significant and substantively important determinants of climate change policies and global environmental cooperation efforts, even when simultaneously included in the estimation models.
Our empirical work utilizes two dependent variables. First, we use a composite index of multiple aspects of climate change policies, the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index, created by Steves et al. (2011) . Second, we employ a measure of the degree of global environmental cooperation from Esty et al. (2005) . To create measures of the Corruption control capital stock, we use two different corruption indices. These come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (time period 1982-2010) and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators project (www.govindicators.org) (time period 1996-2010) , respectively. The advantage of the ICRG data is their longer temporal availability, but they are available for fewer countries. The reverse holds for the World Bank's indicators: they are available for more countries, but only for a shorter period of time. We have data for up to 131 countries, which in 2010 emitted almost 99 % of all CO 2 emissions.
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that countries' historical experience with corruption matters for climate change policies, in particular global environmental cooperation. This suggests that corruption reform programs may not have immediate impacts on the propensity to cooperate on transboundary pollution problems, and patience is consequently warranted. Only over time will Corruption-control yield results. On the other hand, an increase in the level of corruption (a reduction in Corruption-control) may not have as severe effects in countries already benefiting from a large stock of Corruption-control as part of their history. Finally, in contrast to Pellegrini and Gerlagh's (2006) result for current corruption and current democracy, we find that the democratic capital stock (years 1800-2010) is at least as robust a determinant of environmental policies as the Corruption-control capital stock.
Potential policy implications are that it appears important to take history into account when selecting countries for corruption reform programs, and when designing such efforts. Our findings reinforce the recommendation by Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) that corruption reduction programs in developing countries and the transition economies need to address the root causes of corruption with deep and long-running reform programs that include the political sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects of corruption on the environment and develops our argument why the history of Corruption-control matters, as well as the existing literature. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach and data. Section 4 reports our main results, while Sect. 5 presents our robustness analysis. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
Corruption and the Environment: Theory, Evidence, and Our Argument
The theoretical literature argues that corruption has a negative impact on social welfare by reducing environmental quality and resource conservation. López and Mitra (2000) study how corruption affects the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). They find that corruption increases pollution levels above the socially optimal level and raises the income level at which the EKC turns downwards beyond the socially optimal level. Damania et al. (2003) and Fredriksson et al. (2004) , e.g., provide models where the level of corruption is viewed as the relative importance of bribes versus social welfare to the government. With a greater emphasis on bribes, the government distorts environmental and energy policies away from the social optimum. Wilson and Damania (2005) consider political competition and corruption both among high-level politicians who set environmental policies, and lower-level bureaucrats who administer the resulting pollution standards. Lower-level corruption offers firms the opportunity to avoid the enforcement of environmental policies. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) and Damania et al. (2004) discuss the interaction effects on environmental policy of corruption and political instability, and the latter paper in addition considers the role of the judiciary and regulatory compliance failures. Barbier et al. (2005) and Barbier (2010) show how corruption distorts resource conservation. Welsch (2004) and Cole (2007) argue that while a direct effect exists of corruption on environmental regulation, we should also consider an indirect effect. This indirect link goes from corruption to economic growth to pollution levels as suggested by the EKC hypothesis. Biswas et al. (2012) study the effect of the shadow economy (informal sector) and how it interacts with corruption in the determination of pollution levels.
Consistent with theory, the empirical literature shows that corruption has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental and energy policies, increases deforestation and air pollution, limits the access to public goods such as drinking water and sanitation, decreases natural capital, and affects Kyoto Protocol ratification (see, e.g., Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Damania et al. 2003; Fredriksson et al. 2004 Fredriksson et al. , 2007 Welsch 2004; Barbier et al. 2005; Cole 2007; Anbarci et al. 2009; Barbier 2010; Leitão 2010; Ivanova 2011; Biswas et al. 2012 ). 1 Burgess et al. (2012) provide evidence of short run substitution between different forms of government corruption in Indonesia, in particular illegal deforestation and oil and gas revenue sharing. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) show that while corruption is a highly important determinant of environmental policy outcomes, the level of democracy is of less importance: once corruption is included in the estimation, the size of its point estimate falls by at least 50 % and ceases to be statistically significant. Oliva (2014) show how bribery enables drivers of older cars to circumvent car emission regulations in Mexico City. The literature has to the best of our knowledge not studied the effect of historical experience with corruption on environmental or any other policies.
Corruption: Why Should Historical Experience Matter?
The theories discussed above focus on the policy and environmental effects of the current corruption level. However, the environmental policies and pollution levels existing today are to a great extent the result of numerous historical policy, monitoring and enforcement choices, all influenced by the level of corruption at the time. Differences in current policy outcomes are therefore likely due to different historical experiences with corrupt activities, as previous policy and enforcement decisions set the stage for the next round of policy choices. Coate and Morris (1999) argue that interest groups will pursue strategies that raise their benefits from distorted policies. As they become more wedded to these policies over time, there is a higher probability that these policies persist. Thus, suppose a country is currently suffering from widespread corruption, but that it previously has experienced lower corruption levels. The policies determined under the earlier regime may persist as policies may not be dismantled immediately (Coate and Morris 1999) . Conversely, if a country is plagued by a history of corruption, even recent improvements in current Corruption-control may be insufficient for changing policy outcomes. This view is reminiscent of the criticism leveled by MungiuPippidi (2006) of corruption reduction programs in developing countries and the transition economies. If corruption is deeply entrenched in a "particularistic" political culture, reform programs that just borrow "best practices" from developed countries do not do enough to address the root causes of the problems. Deep and long-run reform programs that include the political sector appear to be needed.
One particular avenue through which the Corruption-control capital stock may influence environmental policy making is by affecting expectations that a similar level of Corruptioncontrol will continue in the future (Damania et al. 2004 ). Damania et al. suggest that reform of the judiciary is a gradual process and improvements may be delayed due to bribery. If corruption is expected to remain high in the future (as the country has a small Corruptioncontrol capital stock) political advocates in favor of stricter environmental policies should have a lower incentive to expand effort and resources, as any policy reforms are unlikely to remain in future time periods.
Another reason why improvements in corruption levels may not have immediate effects is that environmental policy may be considered a "secondary policy" (List and Sturm 2006) . This policy area may not be the first policy priority, and a delay may therefore be expected in the upgrading of environmental standards and policies.
Empirical Approach and Data
We will test the hypothesis that a higher stock of Corruption-control capital increases the stringency of climate change policies and global environmental cooperation. Our first and main dependent variable is a measure of the stringency of climate change policies across countries, namely Steves et al.'s (2011) CLIMI takes values between 0 and 1, where higher values represent stricter policies. Tonga has the lowest CLIMI score at 0.011, while the UK has the highest at 0.801. CLIMI is derived from information collected over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . All values for our explanatory variables are averages over this time period. The second dependent variable is a measure of global environmental cooperation from Esty et al. (2005) , the Global Environmental Cooperation Index (GLOBAL). This index is a combination of information pertaining to a country's number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental organizations, contribution to international and bilateral funding of environmental projects and development aid, and participation in international environmental agreements.
The independent variables of main interest are ICRG (WB) Corruption-control Current and ICRG (WB) Corruption-control Capital, with data taken from www.prsgroup.com/ICRG. aspx and www.govindicators.org (Kaufmann et al. 2009 ), respectively. Corruption-control capital accumulates each year with an amount equal to the ICRG (WB) score, and depreciates at a rate (1 − δ) per year. That is, a share δ remains of the prior year's capital stock. Let h i,t be the stock of democratic capital of country i in year t; c i,t is the Corruption-control variable of country i. Corruption-control capital accumulates according to h i,t = c i,t + δh i,t−1 , where h i,t 0 = 0. We calculate and utilize values for ICRG and WB Corruption-control capital for t 0 = 1982 and t 0 = 1996, respectively, and assume (1 − δ) = 0.06, consistent with our measure of democratic capital, discussed below. However, our results are robust to using alternative assumptions about the depreciation rate (see Sect. 5). Note that contrary to the democratic capital stock measure in Persson and Tabellini (2009) in which a dichotomous accumulation variable (a country is democratic or not) is used, we cannot use a dichotomous cut-off for Corruption-control since there is neither agreement in the literature where such a cut-off might lie, nor would any cut-off suggest itself in the source data. Both stock variables are re-scaled to fall into the 0 to 1 interval. For both Corruption-control Current and Corruption-control Capital, we therefore use the categorical ICRG data, which vary from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt), and the continuous WB data, which vary from −1.44 (most corrupt) to 2.45 (least corrupt).
As control variables, we include measures of the democratic capital stock and the current level of democracy, both building on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) . We create Democratic Capital using the 1800-2010 time period. Polity2 takes values between −10 (strict autocracy) and 10 (consolidated democracy). We define democracies as those countries having a positive polity2 score, following Persson and Tabellini (2009) . Current Democracy is the average polity2 value for years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Note that while democracy and corruption are not uncorrelated with each other, the two do not measure the same latent construct, either theoretically or empirically (current democracy correlates at r = .25 with Corruption-control Current if measured by ICRG and at r = .32 if measured by the WB measure). Following Persson and Tabellini (2009) , the democratic capital stock accumulates in years in which a country is a democracy (an increase of one) but not when an autocracy, defined as a polity2 values of 0 or below. Democratic capital depreciates at the same rate as Corruption-control capital, (1 − δ) per year. Let z i,t be the stock of democratic capital of country i in year t; a i,t is an indicator variable which takes a value of unity in years when country i is a democracy; zero otherwise. Democratic capital then accumulates according to z i,t = a i,t + δz i,t−1, where z i,t = 0. We calculate and utilize values for Democratic Capital for t 0 = 1800 and use (1 − δ) = 0.06. The resulting values are rescaled to lie in the range 0 to (converging to) 1 [by multiplying all calculated values by (1 − δ)], following Persson and Tabellini.
We measure lobbying and voters' incentives using two different variables. CO 2 per capita emissions (from World Bank 2012) reflects consumers' incentive to bring about lower fossil fuel prices, and the fossil fuel producers' lobbying incentive to weaken climate change policies. Consequently, CO 2 per capita emissions reflects the amount at stake for CO 2 emitters, and their incentive to undertake lobbying activities. However, higher levels of per capita CO 2 may also imply lower marginal abatement costs (Fredriksson et al. 2007) . While CLIMI and GLOBAL may already have affected CO 2 per capita emissions, the resulting reverse causality should be sufficiently small not to create strong concerns about endogeneity. For example, our results are not affected by dropping this variable. KP Commitment measures the emission reduction commitment in percent emission reductions relative to 1990 (or an alternative base year) of Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries with a Kyoto Protocol commitment may be expected to set stricter climate change policies, as shown by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) . In the estimations reported below, KP Commitment equals zero for all non-Annex 1 countries as they do not have any emission reduction targets. The results are however fully robust toward setting this variable to −8 for all non-Annex 1 countries. −8 is the observed minimum among Annex 1 countries in the sample (Australia was permitted to increase its emissions by 8 %, hence it scores −8). 2 We recognize that similarly to CO 2 per capita emissions, KP Commitment could also be subject to reverse causality if countries which anticipated to undertake future climate change policies were more willing to sign up to more stringent commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In the absence of plausibly valid instruments, in additional estimations we dropped this variable and found that the results uphold.
To control for the effect that non-Annex 1 countries have on this variable, we include a Non-Annex 1 dummy. GDP per capita income in US$ in purchasing power parity (thousands), and captures the increased demand for environmental quality as income rises (World Bank 2012) . Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, including a number of further control variables included in our robustness tests.
In sum, we estimate variants of the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where α is a constant, i denotes country, β i , i = 0, . . . , 7, are variable coefficients, and ε i is the error term. The identical model is estimated for GLOBAL as dependent variable. Since our sample is cross-sectional, we cannot control for unobserved country heterogeneity with the help of country fixed effects. We have attempted to account for the possibility that Corruption-control Capital is correlated with the error term by instrumenting for it in twostage least squares, using as instruments either Corruption-control in neighboring countries or a measure of the remoteness of the capital city based on Campante and Do (2010) . However, in all instrumental variable regressions the instruments are weak, making it infeasible to present such models. 
Empirical Results
The first set of OLS results are presented in Table 2 . Due to the high correlation between Corruption-control Current and Corruption-control Capital (r = .88 for ICRG and r = .92 for WB measure), we start by including only the former. In Table 3 , we include both. Models 1-4 use CLIMI, while Models 5-8 use GLOBAL. We start with the CLIMI models. In addition to our basic control variables, Models 1 and 3 use the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Capital measure, respectively, while Models 2 and 4 include the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Current measures, respectively. While the ICRG measures do not significantly affect CLIMI, both WB measures in Models 3-4 have positive and statistically significant effects. 3 Turning to the GLOBAL models, Models 5 and 7 use the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Capital measure, respectively, while Models 6 and 8 include the ICRG and WB Corruption-control Current measures, respectively. Models 5-8 all exhibit significant positive coefficients on the Corruption-control measures. Thus, overall we find evidence that both the current level of Corruption-control and the stock of Corruption-control matter for climate change policies and cooperation. However, we cannot determine which of these measures dominates. The WB Corruption-control measures consistently have statistically significant effects, perhaps due to a higher number of Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 observations. Another potential reason for these findings is that the World Bank measure is an aggregate composite of multiple sources and might thus provide a more reliable measure of a country's level of Corruption-control than the ICRG measure, which is based on experts' opinions with a view toward informing potential foreign investors. Turning to the control variables in Table 2 , a number of our control variables are generally significant with the expected signs, including KP Commitment, GDP per capita, and Democratic Capital. CO 2 per capita emissions was expected to have ambiguous effects. We find that it is consistently negative in all models, suggesting that higher emissions intensity makes voters and firms exert downward pressure on environmental policy stringency and cooperation.
In Table 3 , we enter measures of both the current and the stock of Corruption-control in each model. As mentioned above, the current and stock measures are highly correlated and estimation models with both included show relatively high variance inflation factors. We also add a Current Democracy dummy in four of the models. Overall, it appears that our two measures of Corruption-control stocks (ICRG and WB) are more important than the corresponding measures of current Corruption-control. Corruption-control Capital (ICRG) is significant in Models 3-4, while Corruption-control Capital (WB) is significant in Models 7-8; current Corruption-control is significant only in Model 7 (and with a negative sign). Only models using GLOBAL exhibit significant Corruption-control coefficients. Apart from a larger number of observations for these models than the CLIMI models (123 and 139 vs., respectively, 82 and 93), one has to keep in mind the high correlation between the current and stock of Corruption-control variables. In our view, it is notable that despite this high correlation, Corruption-control Capital remains statistically significant in the models using GLOBAL, consistent with Table 2 .
We note that our measures of corruption are not without criticism, and our findings should be interpreted in this light (see, e.g., Knack 2007; Ko and Samajdar 2010; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014 ; and the references therein). 4 One potential issue is, e.g., that past corruption may affect current values. While this is a concern, since our study seeks to take countries' historical experience with corruption into account, we believe it is preferable to use a weighted average of past values rather than to simply use current values of corruption (which are possibly affected by historical experience, but to an uncertain degree). Moreover, since our results indicate that Corruption-control Capital is a significant predictor when controlling for Corruption-control Current, it appears likely that the former variable matters in addition to the latter variable.
The control variables in Table 3 show a pattern similar to Table 2 . In particular, Democratic Capital is significant in all models. Current Democracy is marginally significant in only two models, and then with a negative sign. Once we control for Democratic Capital, any apparent positive effect of Current Democracy on GLOBAL disappears, consistent with Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) .
Robustness Analysis
In Tables 4, 5 and 6 we test the robustness of our inferences toward plausible changes in model specification. Table 4 adds a number of additional control variables to the estimation models reported in Table 2 . We include GDP per capita growth (an average over the 2005-2010 time Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 Beck et al. (2001) , affects the time horizon of politicians and thus their propensity to incur short-term cost in order to obtain long term benefits (Bohn and Deacon 2000; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2014) . Political stability fosters investment in "state capacity" (Besley and Persson 2011) , which in turn increases the provision of public goods. Legal origin has been shown to influence policymaking, institutions and economic growth in fundamental ways (La Porta et al. 1999) ; we utilize dummies for French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian Legal Origins (British Legal Origin is the excluded category).
The results in Table 4 are fully robust toward the inclusion of further control variables. 5 Faster-growing countries tend to set stricter climate policies, though note that the effect is only marginally statistically significant in two regressions. Neither climate vulnerability nor small island status exert a significant effect. More politically stable countries have better climate policies, but generally do not co-operate more on global environmental issues. Trade openness does not matter, while countries with a French or Scandinavian legal origin are relatively more committed to global environmental co-operation. A socialist legal origin (somewhat surprisingly) appears to put more stringent climate policies in place.
In Table 5 , we report results from regional jackknife robustness tests, where we drop the countries from one region (as defined by the World Bank) at a time. The purpose is to see whether the results are driven by any particular region. Due to space constraints, we apply the regional jackknife test to Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 2 only, i.e. the models that include the Corruption-control Capital (but not those that include Corruption-control Current). All other control variables are included in the estimation model, but their results are not reported. The results reported in Table 5 echo those in Table 2 . We can therefore be quite certain that our inferences are not driven by countries from any one particular region.
In Table 6 , we report results for alternative Corruption-control Capital depreciation rates (1, 3, 9, and 12 %) using the corresponding models from Table 2. The rationale is that it is unclear what a reasonable depreciation rate is, hence we use a range of depreciation rates from very low to very high to test whether our results depend on the specific rate of 6 % assumed in the baseline model. Table 6 shows that this is not the case: The results are again fully robust.
Conclusion
This paper introduces the concept of a Corruption-control capital stock, which takes a country's history of fighting corruption into account. We find that this historical measure of corruption affects current climate change policies and global environmental cooperation in (up to) 131 countries. An accumulated history of being relatively free of corruption facilitates achieving global cooperation on environmentally sustainable development (see Barbier and Markandya 1990) . The policy implications are that corruption reforms need to be deep and comprehensive and have a long term perspective, otherwise the effects of the bad old days are likely to persist.
